INTRODUCTION
Landowners who sustain economic harm from arbitrary and capri cious applications of land use regulations1 may sue the local govern ment entities responsible for applying those regulations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,2 alleging that the local government entities deprived them of substantive due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 A landowner who brings this claim -an "as-applied arbitrary and capri cious substantive due process" claim4 -may in appropriate cases seek 1. Local governments commonly rely on boards, commissions, and individual offi cials and employees to regulate land use. These government agents apply regulations when they review applications by landowners for variances and special exceptions, rezonings, building and occupancy permits, and approvals of subdivisions and other de velopments. See generally DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., PLANNING AND CON TROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT 193-204, 447-652 (4th ed. 1995) (presenting a typical zoning ordinance and describing its application).
2. Section 1983 states: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S. C. § 1983 (1994) . Landowners may sue local governments under § 1983. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs. , 436 U.S. 658 (1968) (holding that municipalities are "persons" for purposes of § 1983).
3. See Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (holding that application of zoning regulations to individual parcels of land must be consistent with substantive due process); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) . The Fourteenth Amendment states, in relevant part, that "[n]o state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV , § 1.
4. See, e.g., Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 721-22 (11th Cir. 1990) (iden tifying substantive due process claim where plaintiff alleges that regulation is "arbitrary and capricious, does not bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, and is therefore an invalid exercise of the police power"). As ex plained by the court in Eide, a plaintiff may bring a "facial" challenge to the regulation as well as an "as-applied" challenge. See 908 F.2d at 722. All references to substantive due process claims in this Note, unless otherwise indicated, are to claims alleging that regulations are arbitrary and capricious as applied to the plaintiff's particular piece of property.
declaratory and injunctive relief, damages, and attorney's fees.5 Despite controversy among courts and commentators over both the definition of property interests protected by the Due Process Clause6 and the stanTwo other species of due process claims available to landowners are the procedural due process claim, see, e.g. , Seguin v. City of Sterling Heights, 968 F.2d 584, 589-90 (6th Cir. 1992) , and the claim that regulation constitutes a "taking" of property without due process -sometimes referred to as a "due process takings claim." See Eide, 908 F.2d at 721. Landowners may also allege that the government regulations constitute "takings" of property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth and Four teenth Amendments -a "just compensation claim" -or that regulations deprive them of equal protection, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Eide, 908 F.2d at 720-24 (cataloguing different constitutional claims available to landowners).
The due process takings claim and the Fifth Amendment just compensation claim are fundamentally similar, because both require the landowner to prove that the govern ment has regulated the property so as to deprive the landowner of all reasonable benefi cial use of her land. The only practical difference between the two claims is that in a due process takings claim the landowner seeks an invalidation of the offending regula tion and perhaps actual damages, rather than compensation for the value of her property. 1231 (1991) . This Note will refer to "takings" claims without necessarily indicating whether they are due process takings claims or just compensation claims.
However, care should be taken to distinguish the due process takings claim from the as-applied arbitrary and capricious substantive due process claim, the one under scrutiny in this Note. Although both claims nominally come under the label of substan tive due process, they are based on different legal foundations. See Southview Assocs. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84, 96 (2d Cir. 1992); Stuart Minor Benjamin, Note, The Applica bility of Just Compensation to Substantive Due Process Claims, 100 YALE L.J. 2667, 2670 (1991) . Whereas the former requires the showing that a regulation has gone so far that it effectively robs the landowner of the economic value of her property, the latter focuses on whether the regulation, or its application, is "arbitrary and capricious" and unrelated to the advancement of legitimate governmental interests. dard of conduct required of local governments under that clause, 7 the as-applied substantive due process claim can serve as an effective weapon for landowners who seek redress for alleged arbitrary and ca pricious behavior by local governments.8 Moreover, like other constitu tional claims available to landowners, substantive due process claims potentially increase the litigation costs and exposure to liability9 of local (199S) (noting disagreement among courts and commentators "as to whether courts should require a state-grounded property interest before finding a violation of an indi vidual's substantive due process rights"). Other courts go even further by suggesting that plaintiffs must have a property interest that is "fundamental." See Chesterfield Dev. Corp. v. City of Chesterfield, 963 F.2d 1102, 1104 (8th Cir. 1992) (" [T] he conven tional planning dispute -at least when not tainted with fundamental procedural irregu larity, racial animus, or the like -which takes place within the framework of an admit tedly valid state subdivision scheme is a matter primarily of concern to the state and does not implicate the Constitution." (citation omitted)); Rosalie Berger Levinson, Pro tection Against Government Abuse of Power: Has the Court Ta ken the Substance Out of Substantive Due Process?, 16 U. DAYTON L. REv. 313, 316, 346-47 (1991) (noting un certainty in lower courts as to whether arbitrary decisions affecting purely economic rights may be successfully challenged under substantive due process).
7. See MANDELKER, supra note 6, § 2.36, at S7 (comparing the "traditional ra tional relationship" test with the "shock the conscience" test); Richard H. Fallon, Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 309, 325-26 (1993); Stone & Seymour, supra, note 4, at 1225-27, 1231; Armistead, supra note 6, at 809-lS.
8. See Marks v. Chesapeake, 883 F.2d 308, 312 (4th Cir. 1989) (city council's de nial of permit to owner of house after town members expressed "religious objections" to the owner's plans to open a palmistry constituted substantive due process violation); Bateson v. Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300, 1303 (9th Cir. 1988) (government's rejections of nu merous plat applications, rejection of application for building permit, and proposed zone change on property which would prevent plaintiff from developing property constituted the "sort of arbitrary administration of the local regulations, which singles out one indi vidual to be treated discriminatorily, [and] amount [ed] to a violation of that individual's substantive due process rights"); Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 834 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1987) (county supervisory board's finding that plaintiff's proposed subdivision was inconsistent with general plan and board's subsequent downzoning of property violated due process), as amended, 857 F.2d 567 (1988); cf. Bruce I. Wiener, Comment, Obsta cles and Pitfalls fo r Landowners: Applying the Ripeness Doctrine to Section 1983 Land Use Litigation, 7 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 387, 39S (1992) (opining that because of the availability of attorney's fees and because plaintiffs need not bring their claims in state court before suing in federal court, "[s]ection 1983 is an important source of re dress for landowners who wish to vindicate their rights against the government"). But see Dan Tarlock, Lacal Government Protection of Biodiversity: What Is Its Nich e?, 60 U. Cm. L. REv. SSS, S92 (1993) (commenting that substantive due process "has ceased to be a meaningful limitation on government regulations except in abuse of process cases and the relatively rare cases where a local government imposes land use regula tion to cloak another, usually constitutionally suspect, purpose").
9. According to one commentator, a "driving factor" of the upward trend of pub lic sector litigation costs is the "explosion in the non-traditional use of civil rights stat utes -most important, section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1971 -to include cases involving such areas as zoning and land development." Susan A. Macmanus, Th e governments and their individual agents10 who seek to implement land use regulations. 11
However, the effectiveness of the substantive due process claim as a check on arbitrary government regulation and the related increase in costs imposed upon local governments by the claim largely depend upon when federal courts find the claim "ripe" for judicial review. The ripeness doctrine, as utilized by courts in the land use context, requires Impact of Litigation on Municipalities: To tal Cost, Driving Factors, and Cost Contain ment Mechanisms, 44 SYRACUSE L. REv. 833, 836-37 (1993) (citation omitted).
Litigation costs and potential liability may increase even if government agents do not behave arbitrarily or capriciously toward landowners, because of the need to defend against and settle meritless suits. See id. at 838 (stating that 48.2% of respondents to survey listed an overall increase in frivolous suits as a primary cause of increased litiga tion costs born by municipalities). Governments will often settle meritless claims in or der to avoid legal fees and unwanted controversy. See id. at 842 (stating that 81.4% of respondents to survey "acknowledge they settle at least some of their 'winnable' cases just to save money").
For a description of the impact of meritless lawsuits brought against non governmental individuals and groups and public officials, see Jennifer E. Sills, Com ment, SLAPPS (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation): How Can the Legal System Eliminate Th eir Appeal?, 25 CONN. L. REv. 547 (1993). Sills defines a SLA PP suit as a "meritless action filed by a plaintiff whose primary goal is not to win the case but rather to silence or intimidate citizens or public officials who have participated in proceedings regarding public policy or public decision making. " Id. at 548-49. Twenty five percent of these suits, which often "masquerade" as constitutional civil rights vio lations, relate to development and zoning. See id. at 547 (citation omitted).
10. Under § 1983, landowners may sue officials and employees of local govern ments in their individual capacities unless these individuals are protected by qualified or absolute immunity. See, e.g., Blanche Rd. Corp. v. Bensalem Township, 57 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 1995) (involving developer's § 1983 action against township, its officials, and its employees alleging violation of its substantive due process rights in connection with de velopment of specific lots in industrial park). Although this Note generally will refer only to the liability of local governments, it assumes that what is true for the liability of governments often may extend to the liability of the agents of these governments in their individual capacities.
11. For a comparison of the liability imposed upon local governments by regula tory takings claims and substantive due process claims, see Gregory M. Stein Unlike takings compensation, due process damages resemble tort damages, and the plaintiff will have to prove her actual injuries arising from the deprivation. These damages might include increased interest rates resulting from municipal delay, fees for extensions of land option contracts and loan and contractual com mitments, and losses incurred as prospective tenants seek other space. Due pro cess damages could be substantial in some cases, but typically will be smaller in amount than regulatory takings compensation. Stein, supra, at 82. [Vol. 95:492 that local governments have one or more opportunities to apply regula tions to the properties of landowners before being held liable for arbi trary and capricious behavior in federal court. As a result, a court's ap proach to determining ripeness has significant practical consequences for local governments and landowners. An underdeveloped ripeness standard -one that allows landowners to quickly bypass local processes to sue in federal court -likely increases the exposure to lia bility and litigation costs of local governments and individual govern ment agents. Consequently land use regulators will become more timid in applying and enforcing regulations.12 Hence, an underdeveloped ripe ness standard may hinder efforts by local governments to perform regu latory functions that are vital to the health and safety of communities and the protection of the environment.13
On the other hand, an overdeveloped ripeness standard may pro vide incentives to local governments to neglect the concerns of land owners who believe they i;ire being treated unfairly. Local governments, often vulnerable to political pressures in making land use decisions, may violate the substantive due process rights of landowners, and then rely on lengthy local appeals processes to forestall suit in federal court.14 Landowners of limited financial means may not be able to en dure the lengthy administrative processes and litigation and may simply give up on their development plans. "Somehow," one commentator ob serves, "a right which is only available to those with the intestinal forti tude and economic staying power to hire counsel and pay them to con duct difficult, protracted litigation loses some of its luster."15 12. See Sills, sup ra note 9, at 550 (describing adverse effects of litigation costs on implementation of land use regulations). An underdeveloped ripeness standard contrib utes to both higher litigation costs and higher potential liability, because it deprives the government of an opportunity to correct its own mistakes. Increased costs also may re sult from a greater number of frivolous claims filed by developers seeking to intimidate local governments into approving their land use proposals. See supra note 9.
13. For a description of some of the functions of local land use regulation, see Tarlock, supra note 8, at 555-56, 559, 575.
14. Courts disagree over the test for determining ripeness of substan tive due process claims brought by landowners against local govem ments.16 One approach makes ripeness a nonissue; it holds that "the very existence of an allegedly unlawful zoning action, without more, makes a substantive due process claim ripe for federal adjudication."17 A second approach requires the landowner to obtain a "final decision" by local authorities regarding the landowner's desired use of the land under existing regulations. A final decision under this second approach consists of a rejected initial application by the landowner for the desired change in the use of the property -the "initial application" compo nent.18 A third approach also adopts the requirement of a final decision Cir. 1989 ) ("The final local decision which must be reviewed for arbitrariness is the decision to allow a particular level of development .").
22. For an example of a decision applying the futility exception under the third ap proach, see Herrington, 857 F.2d at 569. For decisions applying the futility exception under the fourth approach, see Southern Pacific, 922 F.2d at 504 and Del Monte Dunes, 920 F.2d at 1501-02. As a general matter, the landowner carr ies a high burden of proof that any of the finality components would be useless. See Southview Assocs., 980 F.2d at 99 (holding that futility exception was not met because state's Environmental Board had indicated that it still might accept alternate plans).
According to the court in Eide, it might even be possible under the second ap proach for the futility exception to excuse the initial application component. See Eide, 908 F.2d at 726-27 n.17 (declining to resolve this issue).
tory takings cases supports a finality requirement for substantive due process claims that consists of initial application and variance compo nents. Just as the Supreme Court has held that a local government does not "take" property until it finally decides how the regulations aff ect the property, lower courts should hold that a government does not "act" arbitrarily and capriciously until all relevant governmental agents determine that existing regulations do not permit the landowner's de sired use for the property. Part III argues that broad policies related to the quality, efficiency, and propriety of judicial decisionmaking also justify this same finality requirement. Part IV overcomes theoretical and practical objections to the finality requirement proposed in this Note, including the objection that the requirement runs afoul of a separate holding by the Supreme Court that plaintiffs need not exhaust all ad ministrative remedies for constitutional claims under § 1983. This Note concludes that, even though the finality requirement imposes modest re strictions on litigation in federal court, the requirement helps protect the integrity of local planning processes and satisfies concerns among courts about their own role in land use disputes.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND PRUDENTIAL ASPECTS OF

RIPENESS
Ripeness is a justiciability doctrine that courts may employ for ei ther constitutional or prudential reasons to dismiss a variety of constitu tional claims.23 Courts may invoke the ripeness doctrine when a dispute has not yet generated injury significant enough to satisfy the case or controversy requirement of Article III of the United States Constitu tion.24 When used to ensure that a complainant has suffered injury, the ripeness doctrine "prevent[s] the courts, through avoidance of prema ture adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagree- 28. Nichol, supra note 23, at 170; see also id. at 167 (stating "the 'court actually does make a decision on the merits when it purports to choose the context in which the decision will be made' " (quoting G. Joseph Vining, Direct Judicial Review and the Doctrine of Ripeness in Administrative Law, 69 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1443, 1522 (1971))); cf. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 23, § 3532.3, at 159-63 (suggesting that because ripeness analysis "may be complicated ... by the fact that some rights are more jealously pro tected than others," courts employ a lower ripeness threshold for claims implicating First Amendment rights, interests in privacy, and statutory rights "affected with particu lar public interests," such as those in patent litigation). Although Professor Nichol seems to recognize the awkwardness of using what is supposed to be a justiciability doctrine for substantive review, he does not "argue that this use of the doctrine is ille gitimate." Nichol, supra note 23, at 169. ipeness cases have generated a functional approach that directly weighs the importance of the interest advanced; the extent of injury or risk; the diffi culty of deciding the substantive issues and the allied need for specific factual illumina tion; and the sensitivity of the issues in relation to future cases, the states, and other branches of the federal government"). 34. To the extent a court considers the typ e of alleged injury in assessing the hard ship to the parties of withholding judicial review, the two prudential policies outlined above -one relating to the court's view of the underlying cause of action, and one re lating to role of the court as a decisionmaker -merge. comm1ss1on refused to approve the development plans of the land owner's predecessor in interest to the property.39 The lower courts deter mined that the commission's retroactive application of new regulations to the plaintiff's property constituted a taking. The Supreme Court re versed and dismissed the suit on the ground that the landowner's claim was not ripe for review.40 The Court held that, in order for a takings claim to be ripe for review by a federal court, the landowner must first obtain a final decision from the appropriate government authorities on the application of the regulations to his or her property, and then utilize any procedures available in state court for obtaining just compensation. The Court's finality requirement demanded that the landowner make at least one development proposal to the government and, if that proposal was rejected, an application for a variance.41 Here, the landowner -a bank -had failed to obtain a final decision from local authorities by seeking variances that would have allowed it to develop the property according to its proposed plat. 42
39. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 175. The landowner-respondent also had alleged that the commission's refusal to approve its predecessor-in-interest's plan vio lated the respondent's rights to substantive and procedural due process and denied it equal protection, but these claims were settled against the landowner-respondent in dis In MacDonald, decided the following term, the Supreme Court ex panded upon the finality requirement set forth in Williamson County. 43 The Court held that even though the petitioner had done more to ripen his case than landowners in previous cases -he had submitted one de velopment proposal and received a response thereto44 -nevertheless there remained "the possibility that some development [would] be per mitted, and thus [the Court was] in doubt regarding the antecedent question whether appellant's property [had] been taken."45 Hence, in or der to satisfy the finality prong of the ripeness test, the petitioner needed to reapply for approval of a less ambitious plan to ensure that no development would be permitted.46
"an arbitrary and capricious act by a government is unconstitutional even if the govern ment pays just compensation." (citation omitted)). But cf. Polenz v. Parrott, 883 F.2d 551, 558 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding on nonripeness grounds that plaintiff does not state a substantive due process claim without alleging a violation of some other substantive constitutional right or that available state remedies are inadequate (citation omitted)).
The fact that the Court in Williamson County nominally had decided a substantive due process claim also has not affected the ripeness tests devised by lower courts for as applied arbitrary and capriciou� substantive due process claims. The landowner respondent in Wi llia mson County had attempted to characterize his injury not as a tak ing in violation of the Just Compensation Clause, but as a taking resulting from an inva lid exercise of the police power, violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The landowner argued that, because it was a violation of due process, the landowner was not obligated to seek just compensation through procedures provided by the state in order to ripen its claim. See Wi lliamson County, 473 U.S. at 173, 197-200. However, this argument only changes the claim to a due process takings claim, not an arbitrary and capricious due process claim -the type principally discussed in this Note. See supra note 4 (distinguishing the "due process takings claim" from the arbi trary and capricious substantive due process claim). Therefore, the Court's holding that the landowner's claim -even if categorized as a substantive due process claimshould be dismissed because the landowner had failed the finality requirement, 46. The Court in MacDonald also briefly considered whether the plaintiff had been excused from attempting to satisfy all elements of the finality requirement on the In both Williamson County and MacDonald, the Court justified the finality requirement on the theory that it could not determine whether the government took the landowner's property until the government fully applied existing regulations to the property. A takings claim often demands that a court make fact-intensive, technical determinations of the economic impact of a regulation upon a given property.47 The re quirement that landowners first attempt to obtain relief through admin istrative channels allows a more accurate assessment of the degree of development permitted on the land, and therefore whether the applica tion of the regulation constitutes a taking.48 The Court made this ratio nale explicit in MacDonald, where it stated that a "court cannot deter mine whether a regulation has gone 'too far' unless it knows how far the regulation goes. "49
Regardless of whether one agrees with the content of the elaborate finality requirement for takings claims,50 commentators accurately de scribe the creation of this requirement as motivated by prudential conground that such efforts would have been futile. The Court concluded that the land owner's allegation of futility had been dismissed legitimately by the courts below. Al though the Court implied that the exception would constitute an acceptable argument in other circumstances, it held that reapplications by a landowner could not be futile as long as the government might still permit less valuable development. See 411 U.S. at 352 n.8.
47. Among the factors the Court must consider in deciding takings cases are the "economic impact of the challenged action and the extent to which it interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations." Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 191.
48. See 473 U.S. at 191. 49. 477 U.S. at 348. 50. Compare Kassouni, supra note 14, at 2, 11 (criticizing ripeness test as "stretched beyond its rational limits" and complaining that additional ripeness require ments tacked on for prudential reasons will simply "prevent most middle-class property owners from pursuing their constitutional right to just compensation") with R. Jeffrey Lyman, Finality Ripeness in Federal Land Use Cases From Hamilton Bank to Lucas, 9 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 101, 101 (1994) (observing that ripeness test for takings does not in practice impose onerous burdens on landowners and has allowed subsequent lower federal courts "to create a predictable and understandable body of law").
The Supreme Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) , generated minor speculation over whether the Wi lliamson County and MacDon ald holdings are still good law. In Lucas, the South Carolina Supreme Court had deemed the plaintiff's takings claim to be ripe, even though after he filed his lawsuit the law prohibiting development of his property -here two parcels of beachfront property -was amended to allow landowners to apply for special permits. The United States Supreme Court, in reversing the South Carolina court's determination that the beach front regulation did not constitute a taking, also sidestepped the ripeness issue and did not require the petitioner to apply for one of these permits before creating a ripe claim. See 505 U.S. at 1011-13. This decision is best seen not as a weakening of the finality requirement, but as a backhanded rejection by the Court of attempts by the South Caro lina legislature retrospectively to interpose additional ripeness barr iers to the lawsuit of the landowner, who had already gone two years without a special permit option. See 53. See Kassouni, supra note 14, at 30 (arguing that the Supreme Court "relied on substantive takings principles" in its ripeness holding in Ma cDonald; "[i]f a property owner submits evidence that the denial of just one development application works a taking, there is no logical reason why the claim is not ripe. The property owner need only convince a trier of fact that lesser uses would not be economically viable."). But cf. TRIBE, supra note 25, at 80 (using takings cases as examples where "the constitu tional ripeness of the issue presented depends more upon a specific contingency needed to establish a concrete controversy than upon the general development of the underlying facts").
54. Cf. Kassouni, supra note 14, at 24 (noting that Ma cDonald opinion fails to in dicate "[j]ust how many other proposals must be submitted to establish a ripe claim"). The same prudential concern motivating the Supreme Court's use of ripeness to redefine the cause of action for taki ngs claims justifies a similar redefinition for substantive due process claims. Substantive due process claims by landowners do not implicate rights that deserve more judicial scrutiny than landowners' Fi fth Amendment rights to just com pensation.ss Moreover, substantive due process claims are not accompa-55. "Suffice it to say that even the framers of the fifth amendment saw the wis dom of enumerating life, liberty, and property separately, and that few of us would put equal value on the first and the third." Tahoe-Si!!rra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Ta hoe Regional Planning Agency, 911 F.2d 1331, 1338 n.5 (9th Cir. 1990) (Reinhardt, J.), revd., 938 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1991), quoted in Kassouni, supra note 14, at I; see also id. at 11; Nichol, supra note 23, at 165 (arguing that Wi lliamson County and First Amend ment cases in which the Court employed a low ripeness threshold "tell us far more about the demands of the takings clause and the first amendment, respectively, than about the requisites of article ill "); id. at 181.
56. See Nichol, supra note 23, at 181 (contending that by creating components of finality in Williamson County the Court merely redefined the elements of a cause of ac tion -"hardly the work of Article ill ").
57. See infra note 81 (describing other prudential concerns motivating the Court's holding in Wi lliamson County).
58. See, e.g., Halverson v. Skagit County, 42 F.3d 1257, 1261-62 (9th Cir. 1994) (imposing "heavy burden" of proof on plaintiffs in land use context on ground that "the protection from governmental action provided by substantive due process has most often been reserved for the vindication of fundamental rights"); Lemke v. Cass County, 846 F.2d 469, 472 (8th Cir. 1987) (Arnold, J., concurring) ("I see no reason to read the Due Process Clause as a constitutionalized Administrative Procedure Act setting up the federal courts as a forum for the review of every run-of-the-mill land-use dispute."), quoted in Wiener, supra note 8, at 406-07.
Fifth Amendment just compensation rights perhaps receive greater attention than Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights, but not vice versa. This is evi denced by the Supreme Court's holding that substantive due process claims may not be nied by circumstances that make the landowners' plight more sympa thetic. Broadly speaking, the substantive due process claim is another arrow in the quiver of landowners who seek to minimize the effects of land use regulation and maximize the development value of their properties. 59 Given the similar status of Fifth Amendment just compensation rights and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process property rights, the Supreme Court's logic that local governments cannot "take" property until they have sufficient opportunity to fully apply existing regulations provides an analogy for the ripeness inquiry for substantive due process claims. For these latter claims, courts should reason that one administrative setback for a landowner does not necessarily consti tute an arbitrary and capricious "act" within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. "Acting," like "taking," may be broken down analyti cally into smaller steps. It makes just as much sense to say that a gov ernment cannot "act" without considering an application and a variance as it does to say that a government cannot "take" without doing the same. There is no absolute point at which either government activity may be complete and reviewable by a court. Courts may define "tak ing" and "acting" in a manner that fairly balances the interest in quick judicial remedies on the part of landowners with the interest in effective land use regulation on the part of local govemments.60 Hence, a local to submit an initial application and an application for a variance, see infra text accom panying notes 61-64, in order to ascertain the true governmental "policy" with respect to her property.
61. See Wiener, supra note 8, at 392 (broadly referring to the variance requirement set forth in Williamson County as the "administrative relief element"). Other forms of administrative relief include a special exception, a special use permit, and a conditional use. See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 468-76 (distinguishing these forms of administrative relief from a variance).
62. See Acierno v. Mitchell, 6 F. 3d 970, 976 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding unripe sub stantive due process claim arising out of denial of building permit, where development plan had already been approved by state, on ground that plaintiff had not appealed to Board of Adjustment); Taylor Inv., Ltd. v. Upper Darby Township, 983 F.2d 1285, 1289 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding unripe substantive due process claim arising out of revocation of lessor's permit on ground that plaintiff failed to reapply for use permit, appeal the revocation decision to the Township Zoning Hearing Board, or seek a variance or spe cial exception); cf. Bateman, 89 F.3d at 706-07 (holding plaintiff 's takings claim unripe on ground that landowner failed to appeal to the Board of Adjustment and seek "a vari ance or waiver" from the certificate of noncompliance issued by government employee).
63. See cases cited supra note 20. 65. See Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211 (6th Cir. 1992); cases cited supra note 17. In Pearson, the Sixth Circuit held that a substantive due process claim arising from a "routine denial of a zoning change," 961 F. 2d at 1213, by a small defendant city in Michigan was ripe for review without an application for a variance or other administrative relief. After the city council had rejected the plaintiff 's rezoning application, as well as an amended site plan and additional zoning request, the plaintiff had brought suit alleging that the rejection was arbitrary and capricious, depriving him of substantive due process of law. See 961 F.2d at 1214. The court could have held that the complaint met at least a lenient version of the finality rule, although the plaintiff had not applied for a variance and hence could not satisfy the Ninth Circuit's "stricter test" -despite a statement by the Pearson court to the contrary. Instead, the court rea soned that in as-applied substantive due process claims, where there was no need to de cide whether the plaintiff 's property had ·been taken and whether he had been denied just compensation, an easier ripeness standard was to be applied. Cir. 1990 ) (distinguishing the requirement that the zoning decision "be finally made and ap plied to the property" from the requirement that the local authority make "all other de cisions necessary for the court to determine whether the landowner has been deprived of substantially all economically beneficial value of the property").
The Ninth Circuit in Herrington had issued an earlier opinion, amended by the opinion cited above, that more explicitly denied the relevance of the MacDonald reap plication requirement to substantive due process claims. See 834 F.2d at 1497. How ever, it does not appear from the amended opinion that the Ninth Circuit changed its view that the Ma cD onald reapplication requirement is uniquely tailored to the claim al-substantive due process claims requires at least one reapplication by the landowner have failed to justify coherently this standard.74
In addition, if after submitting an initial application it would be fu tile for the landowner to pursue a decision on this application, appeal an adverse decision, or apply for a variance, the landowner should be ex cused from doing so. This futility exception, adopted by virtually all circuits, provides justice to landowners who cannot use existing admin istrative processes because of the unwarranted manipulation of these processes by government agents.75 The futility exception also allows landowners to by pass the variance component when the government of fers no such procedure for the type of application sought.76 In this way, courts can accommodate the many differences among land use ordi nances. Finally, in exceptional circumstances, the futility exception may ex cuse the pursuit of certain components of finality when the governleging a deprivation of substantially all economically viable use of property. For a dif ferent reading of the amended opinion, see MANDELKER ET AL., sup ra note 1, at 161 (claiming that Ninth Circuit applied ripeness rules from takings cases in amended opin ion but not in first opinion).
74. This failure is illustrated by the Second Circuit's decision in Southview Associ ates v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1992), which involved a developer whose appli cation for a building permit for a residential subdivision -already downsized to ac commodate a deeryard which the developer discovered after purchasing the land -was denied by Vermont's District ill Environmental Commission on the ground that the pro posed development violated the state's growth control regulations. After unsuccessful appeals before Ve rmont's Environmental Board and Supreme Court, the developer sued the Board's individual members under § 1983. See 980 F.2d at 87-92.
The Second Circuit held that Southview was required to submit at least one more development application to the state in order for the claim to be ripe for review. Al though the Ve rmont Environmental Board had applied state regulations "to the one par ticular subdivision proposal in question, it [had] yet to provide a 'final, definitive posi tion regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue to the particular land in question.' " 980 F.2d at 99 (quoting Williamson County Regional Planning Commn. v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 191 (1985) ). However, in attempting to explain why a reapplication was required, the Southview court's only suggestion was that unless it had "a final decision before it, it [could not] determine whether a claimant was deprived of property and whether the government conduct was arbitrary and capricious." 980 F.2d at 97. This argument is unpersuasive, if not disingenuous. Southview could have sus tained a loss of a property interest if it was unjustly denied an opportunity to develop according to existing regulations. Also, the court did not need the benefit of knowing the fate of reapplications by Southview in order to determine whether the decision on the first application was arbitrary and capricious.
75. For example, the government might unjustifiably delay consideration of an ap plication for development, hence making it impossible for the landowner to secure a re jection and proceed to satisfy the finality requirement. and MacDonald -they still would have to consider these additional prudential concerns and postpone decisionmaking accordingly.
The difference between the concern about the underlying cause of action and broad concerns about judicial decisionmaking can be ex pressed in another way. The redefinition of the substantive due process cause of action turns ripeness into an inquiry that asks whether the al legedly arbitrary and capricious act has yet occurred. Courts must deter mine whether the government has indeed "acted" in an arbitrary and capricious manner. By contrast, a ripeness standard driven by broad concerns about judicial decisionmaking is founded on the notion that, irrespective of whether the government has yet acted, courts should postpone deciding a case until they are competent or until it is wise to do so.81
Unfortunately, although broad prudential concerns about judicial decisionmaking have affected lower courts ' ripeness decision�' for sub stantive due process claims, the courts have neither fully identified these concerns nor systematically explained their importance. Rather, in a given case, a court typically makes isolated, somewhat unfocused ref erences to only one or two of these concerns. Section ill .A identifies four separate prudential concerns about judicial decisionmaking that justify applying the finality requirement to substantive due process claims: the ability of courts to determine arbitrary and capricious behav ior, the ability of courts to fashion remedies, comity to state institutioqs, and judicial economy. This section also explains why each of these pru dential concerns provides less support for the reapplication component of finality than for the initial application and variance components. Sec tion ill .B argues that landowners should have to satisfy the initial appli-81. In this respect, prudential concerns about judicial decisionmaking are intended to stand as a justification for finality that is independent of the prudential concern about the underlying cause of action -and the analogy to the Supreme Court's reasoning in Wi lliamson County and Ma cD onald that the government does not "take" property until it makes a final decision -explicated supra, Part II. tions; what they take with one hand they may give back with the other."). This mention of flexibility introduces concerns about the competence and economy of federal courts compared to state institutions. Moreover, to the extent the Supreme Court justified its takings ripeness test on the need for a more developed factual record, it based this test on a concern about judicial decisionmaking. Hence, it is possible for an amalgam of prudential concerns to justify the ripeness standard employed by courts for substantive due process claims. [Vol. 95:492 cation and variance components in order to make their substantive due process claims ripe for review, but for fairness reasons should not have to satisfy the reapplication component.
A. Four Prudential Concerns
Ability of Courts to Ascertain Injury
Courts may turn to the ripeness doctrine because they question their ability to decide certain issues at a particular point in time without a more developed factual record. This is especially true for substantive due process claims, where the issue is whether the government's behav ior may be characterized as "arbitrary and capricious. " Given the highly contextual nature of the local land use decisionmaking process -complicated · further by the large variety of land use ordinancescourts need a well-developed record to put the defendant's behavior into perspective. 82 A finality requirement that includes the initial application and vari ance components helps satisfy the concern about the ability of courts to assess injury to landowners. In the event litigation ensues, courts benefit from an improved factual record that shows some degree of concrete harm to the landowner. Courts can better assess whether the govern ment's actions, taken as a whole, were sufficiently egregious to consti tute arbitrary and capricious behavior.
However, the concern about a court's ability to assess injury does not strongly justify a finality requirement that also includes a reapplica tion requirement. The reapplication component would continue to im prove the factual record that eventually comes before the court because it would mandate at least one more instance of government decision making. But this continued improvement likely would be marginal, given that the government has had sufficient opportunity -through the initial application and variance components -to decide on the land owner's originally desired use.
According to Professor Stein:
The need for concrete facts is acute in land use Jaw, where so much litigation arises out of local ordinances about which there may be little reported case law. With a wide variety of different municipalities enacting land use Jaws and with few of these laws ever reaching the courts, those courts that are called upon to construe these statutes and ordinances need as complete a factual record as possi ble, so as to avoid making overly broad pronouncements. Stein, supra note 11, at 16 (citations omitted). 84. See Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 834 F. 2d 1488, 1504 (9th Cir. 1987), as amended, 857 F.2d 567 (1988) (affirmin g injunctive relief invalidating local govern ment's inconsistency determination, and awarding damages for delay, although injunc tion provided "no guarantee that a development proposal will ultimately be approved"); MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 233 (discussing alternatives to specific relief such as invalidation of current zoning or remand to local decisionmaking authority for reconsideration). Often, the nature of the plaintiff 's allegations necessarily will make possible only limited injunctive relief. See Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 726 (11th Cir. 1990) (discussing hypothetical arbitrary rejection of landowner's application for rezoning in which "the remedy ... would not be an injunction requiring a grant of commercial zoning, but rather would be the overturning of the arbitrary decision, possi bly an injunction against similar irrational decisions, and other remedies depending on the situation").
Ability of Courts to Fashion Appropriate Remedies
85. Stone & Seymour, sup ra note 4, at 1243; see also MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 189-90 (discussing advantages of remedies under § 1983).
86. See Stone & Seymour, supra note 4, at 1243; supra note 11. However, puni tive damages are not available against municipalities. See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 190 (citing City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 458 U.S. 247 (1981)).
landowner deprived of a use to which she is entitled, a court must as sess damages resulting from delays87 and lost opportunity costs.BB A finality requirement may assuage the concern over assessing damages in at least three ways. First, finality will provide more oppor tunities for landowners and governments to reach compromises that in practice might prove superior to remedies devised by courts. B9 In this respect, finality serves as a prophylactic measure to ensure that all pre sumably superior compromise solutions are first attempted. Second, fi nality reveals a pattern of behavior on the part of individual government agents such that courts can determine whether their conduct was so egregious that punitive damages are justified. Last, by postponing litiga tion, finality prevents claims involving only speculative future damages -damages that are predicted to result from a denial of a particular use of the property.90 Where plaintiffs allege harm inflicted by a lost oppor tunity cost, the delay imposed by fi nality allows courts to focus, at least in part, on a fixed period of time in which landowners have suffered measurable, concrete injuries.91
However, the concern about the court's ability to determine an ap propriate remedy does not support a finality requirement that includes the reapplication component. Even if a landowner successfully were to obtain permission on a second, less ambitious development proposal, she most likely would continue to suffer harm resulting from the wrongful denial of her original proposal. At least as a theoretical mat ter, she should still be allowed to sue for the damages caused by ad verse economic effects sustained as a result of not developing according to the initial development proposal. This remaining governmental liabil ity means that the reapplication requirement would not have advanced 89. See Taylor Inv., Ltd. v. Upper Darby Township, 983 F.2d 1285, 1291 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that finality may be required for ripeness because "land-use regulation generally affects a broad spectrum of persons and social interests, and ... local political bodies are better able than federal courts to assess the benefits and burdens of such leg islation" (citation omitted)).
90. See Stone & Seymour, supra note 4, at 1234. 91. Cf. Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 857 F.2d 567, 569 (9th Cir. 1988) (inter preting Williamson County and Ma cD onald to require, for substantive due process claims as well as takings claims, "a final decision by the government which inflicts a concrete harm upon the plaintiff landowner").
the goal of securing a presumably superior remedy -one that would preclude further litigation in federal court -through negotiations be tween the landowner and local government.
One might counterargue that as a practical matter the landowner would hardly ever pursue litigation after receiving permission to de velop according to a modified proposal, and that therefore the interest in achieving a remedy through local negotiations continues to weigh heavily in favor of a reapplication requirement. Moreover, the reappli cation requirement would continue to advance the prudential interests in revealing patterns of conduct by individual government agents for the purpose of determining punitive damages, and in waiting until at least some of the landowner's alleged injury is fixed and measurable.92 Nev ertheless, because there remains the theoretical possibility that the land owner may bring suit even if she receives permission to develop ac cording to a modified proposal, the concern about judicial capacity to determine remedies does not support the reapplication component as strongly as it supports the initial application and variance components.
Comity to State In stitutions
The incorporation of the finality requirement into the ripeness stan dard for substantive due process claims advances the normative goal of allocating a reasonably significant sphere of responsibility to local offi cials.93 State and local governments have traditionally exercised signifi cant discretion with respect to land use issues.94 A meaningful ripeness requirement supports the long-standing sense that allowing local gov ernments a degree of flexibility in both creating land use regulations 92. See Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 834 F.2d 1488, 1507 (9th Cir. 1987) (fang, J., dissenting) (arguing that finality requirement should include reapplication component because otherwise "damages are not calculable"; "Any verdict based upon sheer speculation about the amount of damages is prone to be excessive because it is not constrained by the appropriate measure of actual damages.").
93. See Nichol, supra note 23, at 178 (observing that ripeness "allows federal courts to give due respect to the scope of responsibilities to other government decision makers" and "limits any judicial proclivity to 'pre-empt and prejudge issues that are committed for an initial decision to an administrative body or special tribunal' " (quot ing Public Serv. Commn. v. Wy coff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 246 (1952))).
94. See Ta ri v. Collier County, 56 F.3d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1995) ("Zoning pro vides one of the firmest and most basic of the rights of local control." (citation omit ted)); Tarlock, sup ra note 8, at 558; Armistead, supra note 6, at 794 (describing view "that fe deral courts should stay out of local government decisions" because of "con cern about both swelling litigation and overburdening local governments and officials with damage awards and fe deral judicial interference"). (1981) , that a state's provision of adequate postdeprivation judicial remedies can negate an allegation that due process was denied "would fit best into the surrounding doctrinal framework if it were recharacterized as launching a body of fe deral abstention doctrine" for substantive due process claims). That is not the argument here. The lower courts do not seem prepared to take this route, see supra note 42, and other commentators have demonstrated why abstention by federal courts for such claims should be discouraged. See Levinson, supra note 6, at 356; Annistead, supra note 6, at 792-97 (arguing that permitting substantive due process claims to proceed directly in fe deral court will not interfere with the pre rogatives of local government because of the high standard of proof that must be met by the plaintiff property owner). This said, to the extent the policy of maintaining federal ism supports an abstention doctrine for substantive due process claims, it also applies to the adoption for these claims of a ripeness doctrine that includes the finality requirement. Again, however, this prudential concern justifies including the ini tial application and variance components in the finality requirement but not the reapplication component. Because the landowner theoretically would still be able to sue for harm inflicted by the government's refusal of the initial development proposal, even arrangements that allowed landowners to develop their properties would remain subject to the su pervision of federal courts.
Judicial Economy
A court that grounds a ripeness test on judicial economy con sciously defers adjudication of a dispute so as to conserve its judicial resources for other controversies.99 The court essentially engages in a cost-benefit analysis in order to maximize the value gained from judi cial review across a broad spectrum of disputes. But to the extent the reapplication requirement furthers prudential policies, courts must balance these policies against the hardship to the party of withholding judicial review.104 It would be unfair to require landowners to satisfy additional procedural requirements after the gov ernment has arrived at a final decision on the use for which the land owner is entitled.105 Although the reapplication component might make sense for takings claims, where the injury alleged is the deprivation of all substantial economically viable use of the property, it has no logical connection to a substantive due process claim, where the injury alleged is an arbitrary and capricious denial of a particular use. Even assuming that substantive due process property rights are not as highly cherished as other constitutional rights, courts should not gut them entirely for the sake of prudential concerns, which in these cases would be only margi nal and speculative.106
IV. THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL OBJECTIONS TO FINALITY
Although prudential concerns about the importance of the as-ap plied substantive due process claim and the accuracy, propriety, and ef ficiency of judicial decisionmaking weigh in favor of a finality require ment as a part of ripeness, one might still object to finality on four grounds -two theoretical and two practical. The finality requirement proposed in this Note might be challenged on the theoretical ground that it violates the Supreme Court's holding in Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents.107 Patsy held that plaintiffs bringing claims against state governments under section 1983 in fe deral court are not required first to exhaust state administrative remedies.108 A second objection, more prac tical in nature, is that a finality requirement would impose a costly bu reaucratic hurdle on middle class landowners and entrepreneurs who might go bankrupt or simply give up before securing a judicial remedy for arbitrary and capricious treatment by the government. 109 The third objection, which is related to the second, is that the ripeness doctrine encourages local governments to create administrative mechanisms for relief that in effect benefit the wealthier and politically connected seg ments of communities. The fourth objection -this one theoretical -is that a conscious decision by a federal court to postpone decision on an alleged violation of a constitutional right amounts to an abdication of the court's responsibility.110
The finality requirement stipulates that landowners cannot sue in federal court after the first alleged instance of arbitrary and capricious behavior; rather, they must take certain administrative steps to ensure that the government has truly "acted." Hence, the components of final ity can be challenged as so similar to the components of administrative exhaustion that courts cannot require finality under Patsy.
In Williamson County, the Supreme Court held that the rule in landowner's due process takings claim); see also Mixon, supra note 15, at 713 (arguing for a broad interpretation of Parratt in the context of due process claims arising out of land use decisions). But see Levinson, supra note 6, at 350 (arguing de spite Parratt that substantive due process "focuses on whether the government has abused its power, and any violation is complete as soon as the act is committed").
124. See Fallon, supra note 7, at 344 ("When the Court's confusions are stripped away, Parratt held that there could be no federal remedy for the alleged substantive due process violation if a federally adequate scheme of remedies existed in state court. "); supra note 98.
Patsy is also limited by The other practical objection to ripeness focuses not on the barriers it poses to the middle class, but on the opportunities for certain land owners to receive preferential treatment. According to this argument, the more that land use decisionmaking becomes an ad hoc enterprise, the more certain individuals within communities will be able to use their wealth and influence to turn the variety of administrative processes to their advantage. Not only does this greater potential for corruption 126. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 60, at 1351 (comparing Patsy with the "Court's careful articulation of the judge-made rule that, subject to some limited excep tions, administrative remedies must be exhausted in suits challenging federal adminis trative action").
127. Ly man, supra note 50, at 104 n.12 (arguing for a uniform fm ality require ment for takings and substantive due process claims).
128. Tarlock, supra note 8, at 586, 595. [Vol. 95:492
create an equal protection problem, but it also thre atens to undermine the possibility of coherent land use planning.1 2 9
However, it seems late in the day to speculate on whether local controlling toxic risks to preserving biodiversity will, as one commenta-129. Accord MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 448-49 (observing that under certain conditions "zoning becomes a discretionary decisionmaking process rather than a system in which land uses are permitted as-of-right"); id. at 492 (noting a potential equal protection argument in cases of "spot zoning").
130. See id. at 197 (describing content of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, which has been substantially integrated into most state legislation).
131. Fallon, supra note 7, at 339. 132. Id. at 339; cf. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 60, at 1346-47 (summarizing virtues of judicial discretion).
133. See supra text accompanying note 13.
tor puts it, "place new environmental protection responsibilities and op portunities on local governments, the front line resource management units." 134 Land use regulations also allow local governments to comply with state growth management statutes, which states are enacting in in creasing number.135 An underdeveloped ripeness standard that allows landowners to bring substantive due process claims against local governments upon the first manifestation of alleged arbitrary and capricious behavior would needlessly escalate the potential liability for governments. Fear of increased liability, in turn, would threaten the implementation of es sential regulatory activities. Such a threat would be imposed for the sake of a constitutional right which, although deserving of some judicial scrutiny, would arguably distract courts from attending to worthier com plaints that are better suited for federal judicial resolution.
The requirement that landowners obtain a final decision on their desired land use before suing in federal court helps alleviate litigation pressures on land use regulators. Courts should impose this finality re quirement on two theories. First, by holding that governments do not in fact "act" until they issue a final decision, courts would be redefining the cause of action for violations of substantive due process in the same way that the Supreme Court has redefined the cause of action for tak ings claims. Second, courts should require finality to satisfy concerns about their own roles as decisionmakers. Courts appropriately assume that they have only a "quasi-managerial" interest in protecting land owners from arbitrary and capricious treatment by government agents applying use regulations.136 It is upon this relatively modest role as a broad overseer of property rights that the future of desirable land use planning and ecological protection, not to mention wise judicial deci sionmaking, may depend. 136. C f. Ta rlock, supra note 8, at 563 (arguing that "it is difficult but possible to integrate the 'imperatives' of biodiversity protection with the protection of individual rights within the framework of federal constitutional law and local government regula tory authority").
